Simon was dissatisfied with Ribbentrop`s behaviour and stated that such statements were at odds with normal negotiations before leaving the negotiations. A few days later, on 5 June 1935, the British delegation changed its mind. Simon had discussed things with the British cabinet, who thought the deal might be in their best interest, and Simon was ordered to accept Hitler`s offer while it was still on the table. They feared that Hitler would withdraw his offer and embark on the construction of the German navy, which is much higher than its proposed level. Because of the past, Britain knew that Germany could quickly have the same naval capability as it. Over the next two weeks, discussions continued in London on various technical issues, mainly on how to calculate tonnage quotas in the different categories of warships.  Ribbentrop was desperately in favour of success, thus accepting almost all of the UK`s demands.  On 18 June 1935, the agreement was signed in London by Ribbentrop and the new British Foreign Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare. Hitler called June 18, 1935, the day of the signing, “the happiest day of his life,” believing that it marked the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance.
  In November 1934, the Germans officially informed the United Kingdom of their desire to obtain a contract with the United Kingdom, which allowed the Reich Navy to grow to 35% of the Royal Navy. This figure was mentioned because the formulation of a German target “one third of the Royal Navy except in cruisers, destroyers and submarines” did not seem entirely correct in the speeches.  Admiral Raeder considered the 35:100 report to Germany to be unacceptable, but was rejected by Hitler, who insisted on the 35:100 ratio.  Aware of the German desire to extend their navy beyond Versailles, Admiral Chatfield repeatedly advised that it would be preferable to obtain a maritime contract with Germany to regulate the future size and scope of the German navy.  Although the Admiralty described the idea of a 35:100-tonne ratio between London and Berlin as “the highest we can accept for any European power”, it advised the government that the first Germany could build a navy up to this size, whereas it would prefer a tonnage ratio of less than 35:100, but a ratio of 35:100 would nevertheless be acceptable.  In December 1934, a study by Captain Edward King, Director of the Royal Navy`s Planning Division, suggested that the most dangerous form a future German navy could take from the British perspective would be a fleet of crusades.  Captain King argued that a German fleet of armoured ships, cruisers and submarines operating in the task forces would be dangerous to the Royal Navy and that a German “balanced fleet” reflecting the Royal Navy would take the least dangerous form of the German navy.  A German “balanced fleet” would have proportionately the same number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc. as the British fleet, and from a British point of view, it would be, in the event of war, the simplest German fleet to defeat.
 In response to the United Kingdom`s “guarantee” for Poland of 31 March 1939, Hitler, furious at the UK`s approach, said: “I will brew it like a devil`s drink.”  In a speech in Wilhelmshaven on the launch of the battleship Tirpitz, Hitler threatened to denounce the agreement if the Uk sticks to its “encirclement policy”, as represented by the “guarantee” of Poland`s independence.  On April 28, 1939, Hitler condemned the AGNA.  In order to provide an apology for their termination and to prevent the emergence of a new maritime contract, the Germans refused to disclose information about their shipbuilding and left the UK with the choice to accept or reject the German unilateral approach, which gave the Germans the excuse to denounce the treaty.  For Germany, the German navy was primarily an instrument of political pressure on Britain.